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Abstract 
In October 2003, NASA embarked on the ACAST project 
(Advanced CNS Architectures and System Technologies) to 
perform research and development on selected 
communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) 
technologies to enhance the performance of the National 
Airspace System (NAS). The Networking Research Group 
of NASA’s ACAST project, in order to ensure global 
interoperability and deployment, formulated their own 
salient list of requirements. Many of these are not 
necessarily of concern to the FAA, but are a concern to 
those who have to deploy, operate, and pay for these 
systems. These requirements were submitted to the world’s 
industries, governments, and academic institutions for 
comments. The results of that request for comments are 
summarized in this paper. 
I. Introduction 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) is performing research and development under the 
Airspace Systems Program to enable major increases in the 
capacity, mobility, and security of the air transportation 
system. The Advanced CNS Architectures and Systems 
Technologies Project (ACAST) within this program is 
developing technologies intended to improve the 
performance of the communications, navigation, and 
surveillance infrastructure in support of the program’s 
goals. In 2004, NASA initiated the Secure Aircraft System 
for Information Flow (SASIF) project, an element of the 
Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). SASIF is concerned with 
hardening the radio data links and network communications, 
mainly directed at hostile act intervention and protection. 
NASA is working with other U.S. government agencies 
including Department of Defense, Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of Transportation, and the Federal 
Aviation Administration to define concepts and 
requirements for transformation of the National Airspace 
System required to enable a 3 times growth in system 
capacity. A key concept of this transformation is the 
development of network-centric information systems which 
includes the airborne elements. 
The NASA Glenn Networking Research Group (NRG) on 
behalf of the ACAST and SASIF projects has formulated a 
list of requirements to ensure global interoperability and 
deployment. Here, global implies interoperability or all 
elements including network security whereas deployment 
implies affordability and readily available technologies (i.e., 
technologies that will be available in the next few years). 
The NRG wished to obtain input from multiple sources 
regarding these salient requirements: (1) as a sanity check; 
(2) to ensure we did not overlook something of major 
importance; and (3) to improve upon and refine these 
requirements. 
II. Strategy for Obtaining Input 
NASA, as a government agency, has to be very careful 
not to show favoritism or even give the appearance of 
favoritism toward private or commercial entities. In 
addition, the NRG wanted to obtain input from as many 
sources as possible and as many different types of sources. 
In particular we were interested in input from non-
aeronautics groups as well as from the aeronautics 
community in hopes of broadening the aerospace 
communities’ horizons. (e.g., WorldCom, Sprint, DoCoMo, 
Samsung, Panasonic, Sony, Ford, Toyota, US DoD, 
Eurocontrol, China, Korea, Wide Project, IPv6 Summit, 
IPv6 Forum, 3GPP, British Telecom, T-Mobile, Microsoft, 
Cisco, Intel, etc.). 
Thus, in order to be completely open in requesting input 
and ensured fairness, on February 8, 2005, NASA released a 
formal request for information (NNC05ZVI011L) seeking 
comments on these requirements with the intent to 
encourage open response that could be shared globally. This 
formal RFI expired on March 28, 2005. They are available 
at the following URL: 
http://roland.grc.nasa.gov/~ivancic/RFI/responses/responses
.html. 
As many of the various groups we wished to reach do not 
necessarily monitor the federal business advertisements, 
additional emails and solicitations for input were sent to this 
audience. Links to the request for comments (RFC) were 
posted on a number of Web sites such as: the Association 
for Enterprise Integration (AFEI) the Airborne Internet, 
ICNS Conference, IST IPv6 Clusters web sites and the 
6sense IPv6 newsletter (refs. 1 to 5). A request to respond 
was also sent to the IP Security, Networks in Motion, 
Mobile IPv4 and Mobile-IPv6 working groups. 
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As of May 2, 2005, NASA is in the process of sending a 
letter to a number of National and International airlines 
requesting comment. Ultimately, the airlines pay the bill–
they purchase the planes, pay for communication systems, 
pay for maintenance and pay for security requirements 
mandated by government agencies. Thus, NASA would 
greatly appreciate their input. NASA would also like to hear 
from the automotive industry as there is much synergy 
between the airline and automotive transportation industries 
with the automotive industry providing the necessary 
volume to drive down system costs. 
Although the formal RFI has closed, the NRG is still 
extremely interested in receiving comments regarding these 
salient requirements and input regarding future 
requirements pertaining to network-centric operations for 
both airspace system user operations and air traffic 
management. Comments are being sought from those 
directly involved in aeronautics, as well as 
telecommunication, communication, computer, information 
assurance providers, and electronic appliance 
manufacturers. We believe those outside the traditional 
aeronautics community have expertise and insight that is 
directly applicable to network centric operations. 
III. Request for Comment 
The following two sections contain the salient 
requirement and design concepts from which the Global 
Airspace System will be based. Although many of these 
requirements and design concepts may appear obvious, 
general, or somewhat simplistic, the implications of changes 
to network operations and policy are significant! 
A. Global Airspace System Requirements: 
• Must be value added. 
o Cannot add cost without a return on investment 
that meets or exceeds those costs. 
• Must operate over Global Airspace System, not just 
National Airspace System. 
• Must be interoperable throughout the World (not 
just U.S. friendly nations). 
• Must be capable of utilizing whatever links become 
available–link independent. 
o Must be able to perform critical Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) functions over low-
bandwidth links. 
• Must use the same basic security mechanisms for 
Air Mobile and Ground Infrastructure (surface, 
terminal, en router, oceanic, and space). 
o Critical ATM messages must be authenticated. 
o Must be capable of encryption when deemed 
necessary. 
o Security mechanisms must be usable over entire 
Global network. 
 Must not violate International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR). 
• Must operate across networks owned and operated 
by various entities. 
o Must be able to share network infrastructure. 
• Must use same technology (i.e., core networking 
hardware and protocols) for aeronautics as will be 
used by other industries (e.g., automotive, medical, 
banking, etc.). 
• Must enable sharing of information with proper 
security, authentication, and authorization. 
o Situational Awareness. 
o Passenger Lists. 
o Aircraft Maintenance. 
• Same network must accommodate commercial, 
military, and general aviation. 
B. Design Concepts: 
• Must be IPv6 based. 
• Must be capable of a prioritized mixing of traffic 
over a single RF link (e.g., ATM, maintenance, 
onboard security, weather, and entertainment). 
• Must utilize IPsec-based security with Security 
Associations (SAs) bound to permanent host 
identities (e.g., certificates) and not ephemeral host 
locators (e.g., IP addresses). 
• Must be capable of accommodating mobile 
networks. 
• Must be capable of multicasting. 
• Must be scalable to tens of thousands of aircraft. 
IV. Responses 
As of April 2005, NASA had received 8 responses from 
companies and two individual responses from personnel 
working for United States government agencies. These 
responses have ranged from simply providing information 
on the company and product literature to addressing each 
requirement on a point-by-point basis. The public responses 
have been placed on an open Web server whereas the “for 
government use only” responses have added restrictions to 
allow only specific United States government agencies to 
view those documents. Add responders have been 
encouraged to make as much of their response as possible 
open to the general public. Responses are available at the 
following URL: 
http://roland.grc.nasa.gov/~ivancic/RFI/responses/responses
.html 
Responses have mainly come from both the aerospace 
industry and the information technology industries. The 
NRG is somewhat disappointed that we have yet to get any 
responses from the electronics industry, the mobile phone 
communications industry or the automotive industry. This 
was not surprising, just disappointing. The NRG 
understands that it takes significant time and money to 
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respond to such a request and that without an identifiable 
return on investment (ROI) for the company, it is difficult to 
justify participation–particularly since an open response, to 
some extent, exposes the business plans of that company. 
The NRG will continue to encourage participation from 
these industries. In addition, we will continue to educate 
companies as to the potential ROI available from the 
development and deployment of the Global Airspace 
System. 
V. Monitoring Organizations 
A quick monitoring of the system logs was performed to 
ensure the “for government use only” input was properly 
protected and not able to be accessed by inappropriate 
organizations or individuals. During this audit we noted that 
the material is being viewed by a variety of government and 
private organizations throughout the world. In addition, 
over and order of magnitude of organizations have looked at 
the responses versus providing input. 
VI. Results 
In general, the responses supported both the general 
requirements and the design concepts. The process as a 
whole has been quite useful in sanity-checking our goals 
and highlighting research areas that still need to be worked. 
There is definitely room for debate on the use of gateways 
for legacy systems. Responders that currently support 
existing systems and architectures tended to be more 
inclined to utilize gateways and perceived operations 
continuing over existing VHF and satellite links. Others 
considered new capabilities that would become available in 
the future with the deployment of new broadband link 
technologies. Overall consensus agreed to six major points: 
 
1. Positive Return on Investment (ROI) is critical. 
2. IPv6 is the way to go–virtually everyone agrees on 
this point. 
3. Links should be shared, and the system should be 
provider-independent. This makes QoS a requirement. 
4. A common global security structure must be 
developed and IPsec is probably the best choice. Some 
work still needs to be done cleaning up IPsec 
regarding multicast, envisioning the certificate 
architecture, and figuring out how exactly to do QoS 
with encryption. 
5. The system must be able to share network 
infrastructure. 
6. The system must be extensible to meet future needs. 
A. Return on Investment (ROI) 
The system must provide measurable positive ROI. This 
requirement should apply to all stakeholders in the system 
including Air Traffic Services (ATS) providers (civil 
aviation authorities) and ATS users (airlines, military users, 
and general aviation). Lessons learned from the 
experimental deployment and recent cancellation of 
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) in 
the Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) 
illustrate that ground and air users cannot and will not invest 
in new systems for the sake of advancing technology. These 
organizations must obtain a measurable return on 
investment.  
B. IPv6 
IPv6 is being mandated by the United States Department 
of Defense (ref. 6) and will soon be adopted by other United 
States government agencies such as the Department of 
Homeland Defense. In order to be interoperable with these 
agencies, deployment of IPv6 is a necessity. 
There are significant areas that need to be addressed 
regarding IPv6–particularly when considering security and 
mobility. IPv6 provides many new tools within its structure 
and has features for standardized deployment of IPsec–in 
particular authentication and encryption.1 
C. Shared Links 
Link independence is an important requirement that 
facilitates globalization and supports positive ROI over the 
long run. Thus, applications should be developed so they 
are link independent. Link independence allows for the 
system performance and capacity to be improved when new 
link technologies become available without changing each 
of the implemented applications. Whether these links should 
be over an open systems is debatable. Thus, to what degree 
these links can be provider independent is open to 
discussion. The major issue being quality of service (QoS) 
controls more than security issues. 
D. Common Global Security Structure 
ITAR and other export laws will need to be well 
understood and considered throughout the planning and 
implementation of the Global Aeronautical Network. Within 
the U.S. there are numerous regulations regarding the export 
of technology from a variety of agencies (for example, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 
and Export Administration Regulations). Similar regulations 
exist in developed nations throughout the world. 
IPv6 is a positive step toward this goal as IPv6 inherently 
supports IPsec for authentication and encryption.  
Use of IPsec for mobile networks and hosts or for IPv6 
with dynamic addressing is currently difficult because IPsec 
security policies have traditionally been associated with 
point-to-point addressing. If the source addresses are 
unknown or changing, it becomes quite difficult to 
developed scalable security policy databases (SPD). Using a 
certificate-based system will enable the use of the 
 
1 IPv6 has a standard way to implement IP Security. However, one does 
not have to implement IPsec. Note, using IPv6 does not necessarily mean 
one is deploying security!  
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networked objects certified identity for the SPD in place of 
statically defined IPv6 addresses. This also enables the use 
of public private key pairs with certificates to establish trust 
and identity. Encryption will use these keys. The keys 
simplify the security policy database and are independent of 
the IPv6 addresses. Such certificate-based identity may also 
be useful in enabling use if IPsec for multicast. 
In order to be responsive to time-critical authentication 
and/or encryption, the architecture placement of certificate 
servers (key servers) and proper caching of certificates is 
critical. There simply is not sufficient bandwidth available 
to ensure high bandwidth connectivity to mobile platforms 
(e.g., planes, helicopters, unmanned aircraft and vehicles on 
the tarmac) with currently deployed aeronautical link 
technologies. 
E. Sharing Network Infrastructure 
Sharing of network infrastructure is desirable. However, 
over what types of networks is an open issue. Current 
systems are generally the property of Governments, service 
providers or consortia. The basic reason is to control QoS. 
Thus, if one wishes to send ATM traffic across the general 
Internet, there is much work that needs to be done to ensure 
that QoS requirements of critical traffic can be met or that 
critical ATM traffic can be restricted to specific networks. 
The former potentially enables high ROI. The latter is 
somewhat business as usual. 
F. Flexible and Extensible 
• The design of the Global Aeronautical Network 
must include strategies for incorporation of legacy 
and future technologies. Gateways can be effective 
for legacy network integration.  
• The ability to operate across networks owned and 
operated by various entities will allow system 
capacity to be increased simply by acquiring 
additional bandwidth from the most economically 
advantageous source. 
• Use of the same core networking technologies as 
other industries allow the Global Airspace System 
(GAS) to benefit form the steady flow of 
technologies precipitated by those industries. 
VII. Policy Implications 
One motivation for generating the generic specifications 
and design criteria was to educate the policy decision 
makers of the implications that policy has on the ability to 
implement and deploy a network centric operations system 
for the GAS.  
IPv6 is a very powerful protocol. Existing policies 
regarding architecture and security can quickly limit the 
tools and features available in IPv6. For example, IPv6 can 
enable peer-to-peer secure networking only if policy so 
allows.  
Use of the best link available implies that all 
communications is networked. That is, the current stove-
piped architecture is obsolete. For example, pilot-to-
controller communication can take place over the best 
available link. That means the controller operations are 
networked. There is no longer just point-to-point 
communications through one radio system and one known 
path. Rather, that point-to-point communication can occur 
over any path and RF link and that path and/or RF link may 
change in the middle of communications. 
Operation across networks owned and operated by 
various entities requires a change in policy. Currently ATM 
information is sent over its own point-to-point links and 
internal aeronautical network. ATM traffic is not mixed 
with other traffic, nor does it cross open networks. The 
latter requires security and QoS to be specifically addressed. 
Current policy requires new systems to be “make-before-
break” rather than “break-before-make” even though current 
systems do not operate in this capacity. Such requirements 
may not allow use of COTS standards and equipment. Also, 
a “make-before-break” implies the same information being 
sent over multiple links. The negative effects of doing this 
are usually uncovered during operations. For example, it is 
well documented that one should not split a single message 
flow over multiple paths. The results are often much worse 
performance than using a single path. Thus, “break-before-
make” may result in worse performance, not better 
performance (refs. 7 and 8). 
Current policy requires policy-based routing. How one 
performs policy-base routing over dynamic RF links is 
problematic. Also, the need for policy-based routing is 
highly questionable as the best available link may not be 
known in advance? One may force ATM over a link that 
appears to be operational, but is not (e.g., the interface is 
active, but no protocols are running over the link). 
The policy makers need to understand what the real QoS 
requirements are. Those requirements should consider the 
application and the phase of navigation operations (e.g., 
surface area, enroute, oceanic, etc.). 
VIII. Areas Requiring Further 
Investigation and Research 
Quality-of-Service over various links and shared 
networks requires extensive investigation. Prioritization of 
traffic is relatively easy to do with today’s technology. 
However, even though that traffic has high priority, this 
does not mean it will meet the current requirements over all 
RF links or routes–particularly if some of that traffic is sent 
over the open Internet. For example, satellite links using 
higher bands do not have much of a bandwidth constraint, 
however these add additional delays, which may be 
unacceptable for certain applications such as ATC in 
terminal airspace. Likewise, use of 3rd generation (3G) 
cellular technology (refs. 9 and 10) in terminal airspace may 
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be sufficient, but may not provide the connectivity enroute. 
Together, satellite and 3G may provide the majority of the 
required capability with VHF systems maintained as 
backup. 
Use of mobile networks the air-ground links should be 
investigated to determine if current and pending technology 
can meet the reliability and QoS ATM requirements without 
the use of “make-before-break” techniques or policy-base 
routing. 
Use of mobile networking or ad hoc networking for 
oceanic operations should be investigated. Satellite links 
tend to be quite expensive. Use of ad hoc technology has the 
potential to reduce or perhaps eliminate the need for satellite 
communications for ATM traffic. This would be particularly 
beneficial when operating above the Artic Circle. Such 
techniques may also be useful over the continents.  
Security architectures and certificate-based security need 
investigation to determine the placement of certificate-based 
servers, the amount of bandwidth needed, what applications 
need authentication only or encryption only or both and 
how one implements certificate-based security. 
IX. Recommendations 
Any departure or modification of a standard is non-
standard and will result in very substantial cost increases. In 
addition, there may be a decrease in reliability due to the 
low number of users testing and utilizing these 
modifications. Thus, it is imperative that COTS standards be 
utilized as is or influenced at the standards making bodies 
rather than modified for aeronautic needs. 
An iterative Government–industry dialog through the 
appropriate working groups and forums will ensure the best 
and most current technical information is available to make 
informed decisions. 
One needs to consider the entire system and how it 
operates when considering if reliability and QoS 
requirements are being met.  
Many of the questions regarding QoS can only truly be 
answered by building out a portion of the system. Modeling 
and simulation will only go so far. 
X. Conclusions 
An observation worth noting: Those companies currently 
working in the ATM arena appeared to have a more 
conservative approach than those from other industries with 
regard to network centric operations, use of open networks, 
and the type and variety of links that may be exploited. 
There are a number of possible reasons for this–some which 
are listed below: 
 
• They understand the problem better. 
• They have to work daily with the FAA and other 
international aeronautical standards organizations. 
Politics may play a role here. 
 
• They are producers of legacy equipment. As such, it is 
in that organizations best financial interest to maintain 
the viability of that equipment for as long as possible. 
• They do not understand some of the new technologies 
as well as others. 
 
In general, the responses received to the RFC supported 
the salient requirements and design criteria. The major 
difference in responses was related to how well a system 
may be able to meet reliability and QoS criteria when 
operating over “the best available link” where that link 
consisted of both a variety of RF links and a variety of 
network both owned and operated by various entities. 
Furthermore, there was full consensus that IPv6 should be 
used in the backbone, but some contention on its use over 
air-ground links.  
The underlying questions that will ultimately drive the 
design and implementation are: 
 
• What compromises are acceptable between QoS and 
control of the network? 
• What is acceptable QoS? 
• How does one pay for the system? 
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